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Although most of this year's cases merely illustrate the
application of settled principles, our Supreme Court clarified
or established several important points of the law of damages
in the period covered by this Survey. In perhaps the most
important of these cases, the Court denied recovery of in-
terest in highway condemnation awards. Also, the statutory
penalty for usury was clarified and applied. Impairment of
earning capacity as an element of damage for personal injury
was squarely recognized for the first time. Municipal cor-
porations were held liable for neither medical expenses nor
for loss of consortium and services sustained by husbands of
women injured through a city's negligence. And a factually
interesting case illustrates the elements of damage recover-
able by an insured for his liability insurer's wrongful refusal
to defend.
Interest Upon Highway Condemnation Awards
Despite its earlier assumption to the contrary,' the Supreme
Court held in South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Southern Ry. Co.,2 that interest is not recoverable as an
element of just compensation in highway condemnation cases
where property is taken before payment therefor is made.
This holding is contrary to the overwhelming weight of
authority elsewhere, supported by the reasoning of the earlier
South Carolina case of Haig v. Wateree Power Co.,3 allowing
the recovery of interest when property is taken before pay-
ment is made. The reasoning of the majority opinion was
based on the absence of express statutory authority allow-
ing recovery of interest in highway condemnation cases, for-
tified by the presence of such express authority in other con-
demnation statutes.4 However, in the opinion of dissenting
Justice Oxner, it is not properly a statutory question, but
*Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, South Carolina.
1. In South Carolina Highway Dept v. Miller, 237 S. C. 386, 117 S. E.
2d 561 (1960), (discussed in 14 S.C.L.Q. 30).
2. 239 S. C. 1, 121 S. E. 2d 236 (1961).
3. 119 S. C. 319, 112 S. E. 55 (1920).
4. State Authorities Eminent Domain Act, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 25-27 (1952); Public Works Eminent Domain Law, CODE OF
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rather a constitutional one, since the provision5 forbidding
the taking of private property without payment of just com-
pensation therefor is self-executing.
The decision seems unnecessarily harsh for the landowner
whose property is taken before payment is made and who is
therefore deprived of both the use of his land and of the
money representing its value without any compensation what-
soever for such deprivation. Since the Court has put the
question on a statutory basis, the General Assembly should
take action to correct the injustice arising in this situation,
at least to the extent of allowing recovery of interest in high-
way condemnation proceedings where property is taken before
payment is made, as is provided for under the other con-
demnation statutes.
Penalty For Usury
The forfeiture provision of South Carolina's usury statute
allowing recovery of double the amount of usurious interest
actually received was applied and construed in Atlantic Dis-
count Corp. v. Driskell.7 The borrower had received the
amount of $425.00 from -the lender and had signed a promis-
sory note for $576.00 at the rate of $32.00 per month for
eighteen (18) months, the difference being represented by
the charges for credit, life insurance, the documentary stamps,
recording fee, and $134.51 interest in advance. The lender
brought suit for an equitable foreclosure of its chattel mort-
gage; the borrower, counterclaimed for double the amount of
interest, which was clearly usurious. The issue was whether
the total amount of interest on the loan had been "actually
received" by the lender at the inception of the transaction so
as to fall within the language of the statute. The Master held
in the affirmative, but the Greenville County Court on appeal
held that the entire amount of the interest had not been
"actually received", but that the installment payments made
by the borrower must be prorated among principal, interest
and costs, so that only the interest portion of the installments
actually paid by the borrower could be said to have been
"actually received" by the lender. The Supreme Court up-
5. S. C. CONST., art. I § 17 (1895).
6. CODE OF. LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, § 8-5 (1952). The leral and
maximum rates of interest are prescribed in Section 8-3 of the CODE OF
LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.
7. 239 S. C. 500, 123 S. E. 2d 832- (1962).
2
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held the County Court's view of the matter, distinguishing two
earlier casess in which interest had been usuriously discounted
at the time of the loan and thus was held to have been actually
received by the lender.
Impairment of Earning Capacity
In a case of interest to the practitioners of negligence law,
the Court ruled squarely in Matthews v. Porter9 that impair-
ment of earning capacity is a recoverable element of damage
for personal injuries. The Court further held that to recover
for such element of damage, it is not necessary that the per-
son be employed at the time of his injury, and that proof of
past earnings is admissible and relevant. Although the ques-
tion had not been squarely presented to the Court previously, 10
the decision is in line with the apparently unanimous authori-
ties elsewhere. 1 The same general considerations should be
applied to the recovery for impairment of future earning
capacity as apply to the recovery of other elements of prospec-
tive damage, such as future medical expenses, future pain and
suffering, and lcss of expected profits under contract.
Da~mages For Liability Insurer's Unjustified Refusal to Defend
Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.' 2 was an action
in contract to recover damages for the defendant insurer's
breach of its obligation under an automobile liability policy to
defend a tort action brought against its insured, the plaintiff
here. The question as to the existence of the contract obliga-
tion is treated in the Insurance portion of this Survey. Because
of the insurer's failure to defend under its contract of insur-
ance which was held to be valid, the insured had to retain
his own counsel, and after an adverse judgment, the insured's
automobile was seized and sold in satisfaction. The propriety
of the award of four elements of damage was in issue, namely:
1) the fair market value of the sold automobile, assessed by
the jury at $1,119.15; 2) loss of its use, for which the jury
awarded $145.00; 3) attorney's fees incurred in the defense
8. Carolina Savings Bank v. Parrott, 30 S. C. 61, 8 S. E. 199 (1888);
Peoples Bank of Dillon v. Perritt, 114 S. C. 362, 103 S. E. 711 (1920).
9. 239 S. C. 620, 124 S. E. 2d 321 (1962).
10. In Campbell v. Hall, 210 S. C. 423, 43 S. E. 2d 129 (1947) the ap-
pellant's objection was general, that the verdict was excessive; Haselden
v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 214 S. C. 410, 53 S. E. 2d 60 (1949) arose
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
11. 15 AM. JUR., DAMAGES, § 91 et seq.
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of the negligence action in the amount of $600.00; and 4)
Court costs of $10.25.
The trial judge eliminated the element of attorney's fees
by order nisi, because the complaint failed to allege such as
an element of damage and there was no evidence as to the
value of the legal services rendered. However, in suits to
recover damages for an insurer's unjustified refusal to defend.
reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable.' 3 The Supreme
Court reversed the jury's award of $145.00 for loss of use of
the insured's automobile because there was no evidence as to
the reasonable rental value. The lesson here for the practi-
tioner is that to recover for loss of use, there must be evidence
of the reasonable rental value of a substitute automobile,
and not merely of the fact of deprivation of use. The
Court held the plaintiff entitled to recover the fair market
value of his automobile, but reduced the amount recoverable
therefor to $1,100.00 because apparently the only evidence
in the record as to its value was the plaintiff's testimony
that his automobile was worth that sum. The Court also held
the plaintiff entitled to recover the court costs taxed against
him in the negligence suit.
This case illustrates in a particular factual setting the
application of the general principles governing actions for
breach of contract in general and for breach of an insurer's,
obligation to defend in particular, which principles are thus
stated by the Court:
The general rule is that for a breach of contract the
defendant is liable for whatever damages follow as a
natural consequence and a proximate result of such
breach. (citing cases) Where an insurer refuses to under-:
take the defense of an action against the insured based
upon a claim within the coverage of the insurance policy,
it thereby breaches the contract of insurance and is li-
able to the insured for all damages resulting to such in-
sured as a direct result of such refusal and breach.
(citing cases)
One somewhat unusual procedural matter in the Fullr
case deserves comment. The trial judge very appropriately
13. Annot. 49 A.L.R. 2d 727 et seq. Under the rule in such cases in
South Carolina, once the nature and extent of the legal services rendered
have been established by competent evidence, 'the reasonableness of the
amount of the fee becomes a question for the Court. Carolina Veneer &
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directed the jury to find a special verdict dividing the actual
damages into the various component elements. This procedure
enabled the Court on appeal to analyze the disputed items of
damage separately and therefore very clearly and thus enabled
the Court to segregate and eliminate the improper elements
and affirm the case nisi, without the necessity of ordering a
new trial which would of necessity be upon all issues 4 as in
the usual case where the verdict for actual damages is in a
lump sum figure and includes both proper and improper items
of damage. To follow the procedure here used by the trial judge
in cases where the propriety of particular items of damage is
disputed would conserve considerable judicial effort and would
sharpen the issues in these cases.
Measure of Actual Damages for Fraud in the Sale of Property
In sharp contrast with the mountain stream clarity with
which the issues were presented to the Supreme Court in the
Greenville County Fuller case, supra, is the Richland County
case of Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc.,. 5 where the Court was
called upon to rule upon a question as to measure of damages
as muddy as the Congaree River. The Aaron case, a tort suit
to recover damages for fraud in the sale of a used automobile,
involved the question of the proper measure of actual damages
in such cases. The appellant's exception suggested a com-
plicated formula whereby the measure of damage would be
the sum of the installment payments made by the plaintiff
on the purchased used car, plus the trade-in allowance on
his older car, less the reasonable value of his use of the
purchased automobile. The Supreme Court refused to accept
such a confused idea and affirmed the trial judge's general
-charge. The Court stated the proper measure of damages
Tery clearly and simply:
Punitive damages having been eliminated, the measure
of respondent's actual damage was the difference be-
tween the represented value and the actual value of the
1958 Plymouth at the time of his purchase of it. Turner
v. Carey, 227 S. C. 289, 87 S. E. 2d 871; Warr v.
Carolina Power & Light Co., 237 S. C. 121, 115 S. E.
2d 799. Inconvenience Js no more proper as an element
14. South Carolina Elee & Gas Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 233 S. C. 557, 106
S. E. 2d 276 (1958).
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of damage in such case than it would be in an action
for breach of warranty. Cf. Cannon v. Pulliam Motor
Co., 230 S. C. 131, 94 S. E. 2d 397.
The Court characterized the evidence in the Aaron case as
"quite vague and indefinite; it seems fair to say [continued
the Court] that none of the evidence was expressly or specif-
ically directed to that issue." Upon the record, the Court was
unable to conclude that the award of $2,350.00 actual damages
for fraud in the 1959 sale of a used 1958 Plymouth was
"so shockingly excessive" as to require a reversal.
In this and other fairly recent cases (see the Turner and
Warr cases cited in the quotation above) the Court has
adhered firmly to the so-called contract or "benefit of the
bargain" measure of actual damages for fraud in the sale
of property, under which the measure is the difference be-
tween the actual value of the property at the time of the
sale and the value the property would have had if it had
been as represented. This rule contrasts with the so-called
tort or "out-of-pocket" rule, followed by a minority of jurisdic-
tions, under which the measure is the difference between
the consideration given and the actual worth of the property
received. 16 There was formerly some confusion as to the
proper measure of damages,' 7 but the later cases have fol-
lowed the "benefit-of-the-bargain" rule, which is the more lib-
eral in most cases and which is in line with an older South
Carolina case.'
Damages For Libel
Brown v. National Home Ins. Co.19 is an important case
in the very technical field of libel, but since the issue of
damages is so inextricably intertwined with the question of
liability, the case is discussed in the Torts section of this
survey. It is sufficient here to remark that the case holds
that where a defamatory statement is not libelous per se,
bui merely libelous per quod, damages for embarrassment and
humiliation alone are not recoverable. However, if there
16. See PRossnn, TORTS § 91 at.page 568 (2d ed. 1955) where the two
rules are discussed.
17. See Culbreath v. Investor's Syndicate, 203 S. C. 213, 26 S. E. 2d 809
(1943) where the Court stated both rules, but made no choice between
them.
18. 46 S. C. 426, 24 S. E. 313 (1896).
19. 239 S. C. 488, 123 S. E. 2d 850 (1962).
19621
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had been proof of pecuniary loss, such as impairment of
credit or of a business relationship, damages for such things
as mental suffering, wounded feelings, humiliation and em-
barrassment, would be recoverable, in effect being "tacked
on as 'parasitic'" to the other damages.
20
Measure of Actual Damages for Pain and Suffering
Harper v. Bolton21 is a case which has excited much dis-
cussion and which deserves special study by the practitioners
of negligence law. Although the case involves principally
procedural matters, the Court made the following comments
on the substantive law which deserves quoting since they may
well become the standard jury instruction on the valuation
of pain and suffering:
Pain and suffering is recognized by Courts of this
State as a very material element of damages on which
a recovery may be bottomed. Campbell v. Hall et al.,
210 S. C. 423, 43 S. E. 2d 129. Damages for pain and
suffering are unliquidated and indeterminate in character
and the assessment of unliquidated damages must rest
in the sound discretion of the jury, controlled by the
discretionary power of the trial Judge. Wright v. Gilbert
et al., 227 S. C. 334, 88 S. E. 2d 72. Pain and suffering
have no market price. They are not capable of being
exactly and accurately determined, and there is no fixed
rule or standard whereby damages for them can be mea-
sured. Hence, the amount of damages to be awarded
for pain and suffering must be left to the judgment of
the jury, subject only to correction by the courts for abuse.
Excessive Damages for Personal Injuries
No case in this year's Survey period was reversed on the
grounds that the damages awarded were excessive, although
in one case,22 the disproportion between jury's award of
$500.00 actual damages and $15,000.0G punitive damages in
an automobile negligence case was relied upon as one factor
indicating confusion in the minds of the jurors, for which
reason the case was reversed and remanded for new trial.
In that case the federal court of appeals felt that so great
20. See PnossEn, TORTS p. 594 (2d ed. 1955).
21. 239 S. C. 541,124 S. E. 2d 54 (1962).
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a discrepancy between the amounts of the actual and punitive
damages added weight to its conclusion that the jury was
confused, particularly in view of the plaintiff's serious and
permanent injuries and the jury's expressed uncertainty on
the issue of liability. However, such disproportion alone would
not compel reversal, since under the South Carolina law
disproportionate awards for actual and punitive damages
are permitted.
23
Awards of actual damages for personal injuries were held
not excessive in these three cases:
Biuno v. Pendleton Realty Co.,24 wherein $1,300.00 was
awarded a sixty year old tailor who had fallen on the de-
fendant's sidewalk, fracturing the base of his fifth metatarsal
and spraining an ankle ligament, and being caused to endure
pain, to wear a cast for four weeks and to incur a physician's
bill of $85.00.
- Gaskins v. Ryder Truckc Lines Inc.,25 tried by the federal
district judge without jury, wherein $20,000.00 was awarded
the plaintiff injured in a highway collision who had sustained
out-of-pocket expenses of nearly $5,000.00 and suffered am-
nestic trauma-to'his sl ull and facial scars and who had been
hospitalized three or four times and undergone grave spinal
surgery and who had a permanent disability in his back rated
at 20 to 25 percent at the time of trial.
-,McClure 'v. Price,, 6 .wherein $20,000.00 was awarded a
woman who in a highway collision sustained"lacerations,
bruises and sprains and a fractured cheekbone with an ugly
permanent scar and who returned to work three weeks after
her injury at the direction of her physician in order to re-
lieve mental anxiety but who was unable to work properly,
suffering dizziness, loss of memory, and spells of nervousness
and headaches.
Miscellaneous
The identical legal question arose by way of a demurrer
to the complaint in Brazell p. City of Camden,2 7 and by way
23. Two examples where quite disproportionate verdicts were affirmed:
Beaudrot v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S. C. 160, 48 S. E. 106 (1904) wherein
the actual damages were $2.50 and the total verdict was $1,016.66; Hall
v. Walters, 226 S. C. 430, 85 S. E. 2d 729 (1955) wherein $1000.00 actual
damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages were awarded.
24. 240 S.0C. 46, 124 S. E. 2d 580 (1962).
25. 299 F. 2d 236 (4th Cir., 1962).
26. 300 F. 2d 538 (4th Cir., 1962).
27. 238 S. C. 580, 121 S. E. 2d 221 (1961).
1962]
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of a motion to strike certain allegations from the complaint
in Hollifield v. Keller.28 Taking the two cases together, the
Court's holding is that Code Section 47-70 which allows re-
covery of actual damages against municipal corporations
under certain circumstances does not extend to allow the
husband of a wife injured by a city's negligence to recover
either his medical expenses on her behalf or for his loss of
consortium and of her services. The Court gave a strict con-
struction to the statute and in effect held that such husband
is excluded from the group of persons, covered by the statute,
who have received damages in their property.29 The BrazeUl
case involved a claim for medical expenses and for loss of
consortium and is the more concise of the two opinions,
while the Hollifield case involves only claims for loss of
services and consortium and is the more exhaustive and
better documented of the two opinions.
In Noland Co., Inc. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.,30
the federal court remanded the case for consideration of a
claim for loss of anticipated profit due to a breach of con-
tract, pointing out that the proper element of damage is the
plaintiff's loss of net profit, rather than gross profit.
In Brunson v. Sports,31 an action to impress a trust upon
a tract of land and for an accounting, the Court applied the
well-established rule that when there is no evidence showing a
rental value in an amount different from that actually re-
ceived, the rents actually received govern.
28. 238 S. C, 584, 121 S. E. 2d 213 (1961).
29. CoD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 47-70 (1952) provides in part:
"Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his person
or property through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public
way or by reason of a defect or mismanagement of anything under control
of the corporation within the limits of any city or town may recover in an
action against such city or town the amount of actual damages sustained
by him by reason thereof if such person has not in any way brought about
any such injury or damage by his own negligent act or negligently con-
tributed thereto."
30. 301 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir., 1962).
31. 239 S. C. 58, 121 S. E. 2d 294 (1961).
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